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Dementia, discourse, difference and denial : "who did I become?"
Abstract
If I am no longer a woman, why do I still feel I'm one? If no longer worth holding, why do I crave it? If no
longer sensual, why do I still enjoy the soft texture of satin and silk against my skin? If no longer sensitive,
why do moving song lyrics strike a responsive chord in me? My every molecule seems to scream out that
I do, indeed, exist, and that existence must be valued by someone!
Western medicine's fascination with the human brain and its workings is still marked by blurred
boundaries between the mappings of neuro-anatomy and culturally inflected interpretations of neuropsychology. This essay attempts to trace some of the intersections and overlaps between biomedical
discourse and cultural politics as they come together in constructing the figure of the dementia body.
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DEMENTIA, DISCOURSE,
DIFFERENCE AND DENIAL:
'WHO DID I BECOME?'
Jeannette Stirling

f I am no longer a woman, why do I still feel I'm one?
If no longer worth holding, why do I crave it? If no
longer sensual, why do I still enjoy the soft texture of
satin and silk against my skin? If no longer sensitive, why
do moving song lyrics strike a responsive chord in me? My
every molecule seems to scream out that I do, indeed, exist,
and that existence must be valued by someone! 1

I

Western medicine's fascination with the human brain and its workings is
still marked by blurred boundaries between the mappings of neuro-anatomy
and culturally inflected interpretations of neuro-psychology. This essay
attempts to trace some of the intersections and overlaps between biomedical
discourse and cultural politics as they come together in constructing the
figure of the dementia body. ~
Not all nuances of meaning, either biomedical or cultural, sited with the
dementia body will be addressed here. Nor will this essay refute the current
biomedical model of Alzheimer's Disease. Rather, it is a meditation on the
social, medical and legal vicissitudes faced by the dementia sufferer and their
immediate social network. It will also raise questions about the psychosocial limits inscribed on the body of the dementia patient by the institution.
I want to explore extended ways of thinking about the dementia body; to
consider some of the processes by which this failing body is supplemented
and subjectivity displaced as the social subject becomes medical patient.
Throughout this paper I will be using the term 'dementia' to refer to senile
dementia of the Alzheimer's type and multi-infarct dementia.
In relation to theories of the body articulated by Julia Kristeva, Elizabeth
Grosz, Linda Butler and Alphonso Lingis, I will discuss the dementia body
as an 'improper body'; a body of both excess and decomposition. The aged,
disenfranchised body is traceable throughout these theoretical models as a
shadowy presence. I will also speculate on the ways that the disruptive body
of dementia is refigured and contained through the discourses of
biomedicine and medical law. Is it possible to maintain or re-articulate
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cultural and social heterogeneity once the subject has become the object of
the clinical gaze? Is it possible to deflect the denial of difference that accTetes
within the standardising practices of biomedicine? Clues to these questions
might be fOlmd in an examination not only of the divisions between dementia
and so-called normality, but also of the connections. The processes that
produce the normalised and medicaIised body as they come into conjunction
will also be discussed. To this end, I will take into account the various ways
that the dementia subject is indoctrinated into the specialised conununities of
Dementia Specific Hostels.
Expressions such as 'that person is not in their right mind' or 'this person
has lost/is losing their mind' are part of our everyday language. They signify
social perceptions of a shift between so-called normal and abnonnal
behaviour in an individual. The tenn 'dementia' carries similar connotations.
Blakiston's Medical Dictionary defines dementia through its etymology in
the Latin word demens: 'out of one's mind'. If being in one's right mind is
both a cultural and a medical ~orm, how do these interwoven systems of
signification register the person who is in the process of losing their mind'!
If, because of brain injury or disease, the one we kJloW 'is no longer her or
himself', then whom do they become?
In the topology of the healthy body the brain occupies a privileged
position. It is the primary symbol of humanity, associated with intellect,
reason and creativity. The brain is also considered the locus of subjectivity.
The spectre of dementia is distressing precisely because it attacks these
higher faculties and disrupts our cultural myths about a wise and dignified
old age. It destabilises the hope that the legacy of an advancing maturity will
include respect and social status, as well as providing a serene space beyond
the passions that drive youth and middle age. The figure of the dementia
body signifies the demands of a socially unmediated materiality. It functions
as the re/presentation of the body on the brink of the 'abyss' in the symbolic
order (Kristeva 1982, Gross 1990).2 In the rhetoric of narratives about dIe
brain 'I not being 'right minded' in old age becomes a trope connoting the
irrational, the wilful, the intractable, in culture as well as medicine.
In 1990 the World Health Organisation described dementia as:
A syndrome due to disease of the brain, usually of a chronic
or progressive nature, in which there is disturbance of
multiple higher cortical functions, including memory,
thinking, orientation, comprehension, calculation, learning
capacity, language and judgement. Consciousness is not
clouded. Impairments of cognitive function are commonly
accompanied, and occasionally preceded, by deterioration
in emotional control, social behaviour, or motivation (Jonn
et al1993: 1). 3
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An unclouded consciousness, concomitant with a slow and insidious
onset, is crucial to a diagnosis of dementia rather than some other form of
neuro-psychological dysfunction. Whilst the patient is alive the disorder is
typically described by its observable symptoms; clinical assessment is reliant
on the medical gaze and the presupposition of a nonn, Histological diagnosis
can only be confirmed after death.
Michel Foucault claims that:
In order to know the truth of the pathological fact, the
doctor must abstract the patient: He[sic] who describes a
disease [or syndrome] must take care to distinguish the
symptoms that necessarily accompany it, and which are
proper to it, from those that are only accidental and
fortuitous, such as those that depend on the temperament
and age of the patient (1973: 8),4
In other words, the diagnostician must avoid conflating signs of
difference with signs of disease. This is the problem faced by the medical
professional when using current diagnostic tools to identify and map
dementia in the living body. How are the boundaries between pathology and
socialisation located and identified when it is the subject's intellect and
cognitive function that are the focus of the diagnostician's gaze?
Although the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) is deemed a
'useful screening test' (Jorm et al 1993: 24), and is widely used in this
country to aid diagnosis of dementia, it can give false positive results. This
occurs primarily because the test is predicated on specific assumptions about
the subject's knowledge of and relationship to the world beyond corporeal
boundaries. Consequently, those who have a cultural view substantially at
odds with the criteria laid down by the examination will register ai)
embodying signs of dementia. The MMSE will also register dementia
symptomatology for those subjects with a limited intelligence unrelated to
dementia, and those from a social environment significantly different to the
one assumed by the test. Ascription of meaning in this dialogue between
patient and diagnostician is fraught with potential for misinterpretation, and
the test's useful application seems contingent on a cultural and social
proximity between the participants. The MMSE's reliability in establishing
correlatives between cognition and competence to make decisions is also
questionable.
The changes wrought on the body by dementia have been likened to the
plight experienced by Gregor Samsa in Franz Kafka's short story,
Metamorphosis (Moody 1992: 87),5 Kafka's narrative explores the way that
Gregor's family react to the event of his change. At rust they are horrified,
and deny his presence in the alien persona that has become part of their lives.
GradUally, there is adaptation which entails a forgetting of the person who
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existed pre-metamorphosis. Gregor has become the other: he is expunged
from the core realities of Samsa family life.
As dementia progressively marks the body, various social processes
begin to fragment; long established standards of personal hygiene break
down, and the sufferer may experience difficulties with eating. The ability to
recognise the faces of family and close friends eventually fails as the
syndrome continues to redefine the body. In advanced stages of the disorder
the sufferer becomes incontinent of urine and/or faeces and may lapse into a
vegetative state: 'mute, [totally] withdrawn from the world ... confined to
bed, with limbs in a characteristic position of flexion'.6
Within the prevailing symbolic systems of culture and biomedicine, the
morphology of corporeality in the late phases of dementia comes to signify
the abject or the grotesque.' The dementia process reasserts the improper
body as the symbolically sanctioned body falls into a state of increasing
decomposition. The subject is returned to a pre-symbolic state, to a space
that Gross calls 'the underside of the ssmbolic' (1990: 89). Ethnicity, gender,
class and education are no protection against dementia and the salient feature
here, from a cultur~ standpoint, is the implicit yet vigorous urge to deny the
possibility of this particular dysfunction for ourselves. This denial is
accomplished tllrougb the marginalisation or containment of the disruptive
body within the regimes of biomedicine as the dementia body eventually
becomes relegated to the status of infrahuman.
The dementia figure occupies the subject position of other in relationship
to dominant realities, and Evelyn Fox Keller's observations about the
significance of language in establishing meaningful relationships between
variant realities capture the plight of the sufferer very well:
Sharing a language means sharing a conceptual universe. It
means more than knowing the 'right' names by which to
call things; it means knowing the 'right' syntax in which to
pose claims and questions, and even more critically it
means sharing a more or less agreed-upon understanding of
what questions are legitimate to ask, and what can be
accepted as meaningful answers (1992: 27-28).&
Disruptions in language use are a part of the dementia process; there are
hesitations and gaps in the subject's abilities to use language effectively.
Circumlocution and confabulation become the compensatory means by
which the dementia patient seeks to maintain verbal communication and
connection with the 'right minded' . As speech patterns regress they become
simplified and circumspect; long, rambling phrases replace specific words.
Eventually these phrases become reduced to short, sometimes garbled,
responses or non sequiturs.
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So when do the 'right minded' stop listening in any meaningful way to
the dementia speaker? When do we start to disassociate the dementia subject
from the person who shared our life before the metamorphosis began? When
does the notion of a shared language, and therefore a shared conceptual
universe or 'reality', become so fractured and dissipated by the sufferer's
pathology that we begin to discount statements made and questions asked by
them simply because it is easier not to listen? TIlese questions have a cntical
part to play in the ethical dilemmas currently facing our society and the
medico-legal system; not the least when it comes to issues of consent.
To give 'consent' as defined by The Oxford Dictionary is to 'Voluntarily
accede to or acquiesce in what another proposes or desires; to agree, comply,
yield'. Further, it is 'concurrence [or] permission' in an event. It is these
defmitions of 'consent' that are closest to the meanings adhered to in British
and Australian law (Young 1986: 12-26),9 Giving and, by inference,
withholding consent within the context of medical practice remains
somewhat of a minefield. Unless faced with a medical event as specified in
Part 5, Division 2 of the Guardianship Act (GA), a doctor must obtain
consent before medical treatment can be implemented. This is (''fUcial in
safeguarding the medical practitioner against future accusations of medical
assault or malpractice. In the past, when the patient was unable to give
consent on their own behalf, consent was accepted from the next of kin. This
process was not legally valid, and the medical practitioner remained at legal
risk. Recent changes to the Guardianship Act now specify who can legally
act as decision-maker on behalf of one who cannot give consent for her or
himself. 10
The debate about what constitutes consent, or even more contentiously,
what constitutes 'informed consent', has been a feature of the terrain in that
juncture between medicine and the law for some time (Herz et al 1992,
Finucane et al 1993, Hancock 1993).11 The spirit of the concept is about
autonomy; the right of the social subject to exercise agency over what
happens medically to their body. Increasingly, this ideal bas been
backgrounded by the litigious exigencies of medical practice and current
application has the concept of consent prescTibed by a series of medico-legal
criteria that position the patient as agent in their own medical treatment only
insofar as this agency is legally expedient for the medical practitioner.
In a paper exploring the concerns attached to current arguments about
consent, and competency to give or with hold it, Paul Finucane et al point out
that questions of competence often arise from conflict between the health
care provider and the patient. Although the paper calls for self-analysis on
behalf of the medical practitioner in these instances, it also acknowledges
that 'If the benefits are great and the violation of autonomy is minimal,
paternalism may be justifiable, and the wishes of the patient may in some
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cases be overridden' (1993: 401).
Consent within a medical environment has become (generally) less
concerned with the exchange of information about treatment options and
necessarily more concerned with the legal requirements of medical practice.
Less about the proliferation of conununication between the medical and nonmedical and increasingly a dialogue between the two variant but contiguous
discursive systems of medical practice and medical law. The reasons for this
shift are far too complex to explore within the parameters of this essay.
However, given the intricacies of the debate and the ramifications of medical
consent, it is not difficult to gain a sense of the difficulties faced by the
subject with cognitive and/or language difficulties in trying to negotiate this
system.
Diana Friel McGowin provides a rare and telling insight into some of the
problems faced by the dementia subject/patient in her autobiographical text,
Living in the Labyrinth. The observations she brings to bear on her own
plight are even more compelling given the medical view that dementia
patients often have little or no ongoing'awareness of the significance of their
symptomatology. McGowin recounts the devastating effect that an impatient
husband's 'wrap it up hand signal' has on her speech patterns: 'At the sight
of that wretched hand sign, my speech would immediately falter and I would
begin stammering, losing my train of thought altogether' (1994: 99). With
equally devastating effect, she would be urged by other family members to
slow her speech to facilitate an understanding between her and listener(s).
Transpose this type of verbal interaction into the fonnalised settings of
the institution, with its attendant unfamiliarity which challenges even the
most articulate to be confidently coherent, and some of the difficulties faced
by the dementia sufferer in trying to maintain a voice that will register
beyond their symptomatology become patently obvious. McGowin also
writes evocatively of her frustrations in the early days of the disorder. When
trying to get the neurologist to listen to her accounts or narratives about her
bodily expe.,riences, she continually came up against a moment in those
exchanges when these empirical observations were deemed irrelevant or
even counter-productive to the process of diagnosis. The privileged position
that biomedical discourse assumes over the body facilitates a displacement
of subjectivity as the body is repositioned in tetmS of pathology. How is it
then possible to negotiate a speaking position from within that dominant
regime?
Most of the literature on dementia has a section on the 'aggression'
sometimes manifested by the dementia patient. However, much of the textual
information available on aggression is marked by uncertainty as to the
pathological significance of this 'phenomenon'. Writing for the Australian
Alzheimer's Association, Zsoka Prochazka et al claim that:
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Some people with dementia can become very aggressive
and completely unreasonable. It is often exaggerated,
uncalled for, and possibly not even directed to the person
who bears the brunt of the outburst (1990: 31-32),12
Marshal F Folstein and Frederick W Bylsma cite research suggesting that
'aggressive patients were more likely to have a premorbid history of
aggression ...' (1994: 33).13 That is, this behaviour was part of the subject's
pre-medicalised social behaviour and not necessarily a pathological signifier
of dementia. Despite ambiguities about the significance of aggression, it is
placed unproblematically within the parameters of dementia
symptomatology. Yet there is very little theorising about why it occurs.
Underscoring both of these texts is a failure to make explicit connections
between the normal and the pathologised body.
Medical concern has been primarily directed towards coping strategies
for carers. It is significant that many of the current therapies used in dementia
care - therapies such as psychosocial management, validation therapy,
diversionary and normalisation therapy, music therapy - whilst thought to
positively enhance the quality of life for the dementia patient, are definitely
seen to 'promote higher standards of nursing care' (Jonn et al 1993: 32) by
improving the attitude and behaviour of carers and hostel staff. Fluctuations
in the behaviour of the one afflicted are deemed to be merely part of their
pathology rather than a response to the particularities of their situation.
The medical gaze assumes a great deal about dementia; for instance, it
also assumes that a flattened~affect - an absence of emotional display signifies a lack of emotional experience. McGowin's account fiys in the face
of that assumption, at least as a generality. It may well be that irritation and
anger, those acts that are currently refigured as 'aggression', are signifiers of
the extreme frustration and despair experienced by the dementia sufferer
trying to maintain a 'voice', or even a space from which to speak, against
devastating physical and institutional odds.
The prospect of being subjected to imposed realities for 5·10 years when
one's own is already being fragmented by failing health is daunting. Even
without the added distress of dementia, these other-imposed limitations
would be difficult to tolerate over time. It seems logical and proper to
express concern, or even dissatisfaction, if environmental circumstances are
counter-productive to personal needs. However, those afflicted with
dementia are constrained in the ways that they can express dissatisfaction
and distress, becoming enrnired in a co-operative/disruptive patient
dichotomy.
In mapping the dementia body, biomedical discourse is bound either to
pathologise the social behaviour of the subject, or dismiss it as irrelevant to
the project of diagnosis. This constitution of the body has far-reaching
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effects for the life of the subject beyond diagnosis, and the marks of this
discursive induction are readily observable in Dementia Specific Hostels.
Members of a Dementia Hostel community are typically mobile and
socially interactive in that they enjoy and are able to engage in relationships
of love, hate, rivalry, competition and alliance with other community
members, albeit sometimes at a mkTo-level. Dementia is the mark of their
communality, but beyond that they are as diverse and marked by social
difference as those in wider communities. Because dementia communities
are founded on the premise of a shared cognitive disorder, they are structured
primarily as medical sites. The more innovative are self-consciously
homelike and some effort is made to background their utilitarian function.
Nevertheless, the discursive system informing their hierarchical structure
precludes even these residences from functioning as anything other then
institutional extensions.
Contextualisation of the body into the discursive regimes of a medico~
legal system necessarily incurs a loss of freedoms and rights for the dementia
subject. Concepts of personal autonomy are constructed and controlled by
designated carers. Hostel community residents are, at the very least, deemed
to be in 2nd stag,e or moderate dementia. This usually means that they will
have appointed a representative who has their Enduring Power of Attorney 14
or will have been made charges of the Governmentally administered
Guardianship Committee, However, this legal aspect of the disorder varies
widely, and the availability of information to concerned parties prior to the
need for an increase in care requirements seems to depend very much on the
social status or class of the subject(s).
Organising an Enduring Power of Attorney after dementia has started to
run its course is problematic; the legal system requires that the subject
(principal or donor) be cognisant of the legal and social implications of
designating an appointee (attorney) to act on their behalf. Given the language
difficulties experienced by dementia sufferers and the problems associated
with trying to maintain focus, establishing whether or not a subject has
cognition of the consequences of her/his actions in this matter is fraught with
pitfalls.
An alternative to instantiating an Enduring Power of Attorney is to have
the Guardianship Committee either appoint a guardian or assume that
responsibility in the absence of an appropriate individual appointee. The
legal criteria of the medical system require that someone (as specified Part 5,
Divisions 2, 3, 4, 5, GA) give consent on behalf of intellectually impaired
people before non-urgent treatments take place. Ideally this is someone who
has knowledge of and respect for that individual's overall wishes about their
body in relationship to biomedical technology; someone who is familiar with
the subject/patient's own bodily narratives. However, the ideal rarely comes
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into play here, and although the Guardianship Committee may act with best
intentions to safeguard the rights of the intellectually impaired person, it is
difficult to see bow the dialogue between this institution and the medical
practitioner avoids becoming a dialogue between two discursive systems
over the pathologised body.
Necessarily erased from this dialogue are the value-systems and desires
of the pre-medicalised subject. The body of the patient is reinscribed through
the biomedical writing of its disease. This body, as it ha~ been produced
through the language of biology and symptomatology, is then understood
and interpreted within specific frames of reference that exclude dimensions
of meaning relevant to subjectivity. is In other words, the rights safeguarded
by this system are the rights of the discursively generated 'patient' and not
necessarily the rights or desires of the unified subject. There is a split
between the ailing, silenced body as it is constituted by the institution, and
the socially sanctioned, articulate body.
Personal autonomy decreases exponentially as care requirements
increase and the subject becomes progressively inscribed by the medicolegal system. That which does not register within these systems is denied or
erased; issues of sexuality, cultural history and class become the intangible
detritus expunged from the official narratives (case histories, juridical text~)
mapping the dementia body. In a sense, the subject afflicted with dementia is
under siege not only from the neurological degeneration robbing them of
intellectual life and autonomy but also from a discursive system
fundamentally geared to register difference as a signifier of pathology.
The homogenising processes of the dominant regime function to
determine and police what is normal (appropriate) and abnonnal
(inappropriate) behaviour, what is natural and what is unnatural. So, with
apologies to Jack Nicholson, one who has enjoyed a life-long cultural
practice of 'dancing naked with the devil in the pale moonlight', 16 once
intextuated into the medical-legal system determining the parameters of
dementia, may have signs of difference and dissidence, of unscnpted
pleasure and jouissance redefmed as further evidence of symptomatology.
The unorthodox becomes part of the diagnostic field.
Processes constructed to contain the transgressive body are observable
within hostel environments, and those residents who partake of mutually
consenting sexual alliances, or indeed any activity founded on mutual or
private pleasure disapproved of by the hierarchy governing their lives, will
suffer the intervention of carers. The resident/patient will be subject to
prevailing institutional value systems regardless of any pre-medical
difference from those systems. It is futile to assert agency when this
intervention occurs; dissension and/or so-called disruptive behaviour are
registered as signifiers of dementia.
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Society is not adept at accommodating notions of sexuality when it
comes to the aged. In his keynote address at a recent conference on sexuality
and medicine, Alphonso Lingis referred to graffiti popular on Paris walls
during the sixties: 'The young make love, the old make obscene gestures' .17
This slogan poignantly encapsulates the prevailing belief in Western culture
that 'sexual pleasure' and 'geriatric' are somehow mutually exclusive
concepts. Resistance to the notion of aged sexuality is further exacerbated
when the aged body is subject to cerebral dysfunction. If the aged body is
denied erotic potential within our culture, the aged, dysfunctional body is
anathema to eroticism. Yet again, McGowin's narrative seeks to destabilise
this reading of the body and reclaim her right to eroticised pleasures: 'I
desired, and physically and emotionally needed warm, passionate touch; to
feel my body acquiesce and spasmodically explode in return' (McGowin
1993: 85).
There is very little written about sex and dementia. What has been written
is inflected through a heterosexual imperative and seems to reconstitute in
narrative economies age~old concerns about female and male sexuality.
Folstein and Bylsma's research into the noncognitive symptoms of
Alzheimer's disease worries that some male patients seem to develop a
'sexual apraxia' (1994: 33) that leaves them 'clumsy and uncoordinated'.
The use of gendered pronominals to construct the following textual excelpt
on sexuality problematises female sexuality as being potentially disruptive to
decorum as 'she' becomes 'sexually demanding':
Sometimes the sexual behaviour of a person with a brain
disorder may change in ways that are hard for (her) partner
to accept or manage. When the impaired person cannot
remember things for more than a few minutes (she) may
still be able to make love, and want to make love, but will
~ost immediately forget when it is over, leaving her
spouse or partner heartbroken and alone (emphasis added.
Mace et al1991: 216).18
Unfortunately this textual practice also lends the advice to the
beleaguered partner a sense of the parodic as it goes on to reassure: 'It can .
be devastating to a spouse when a person who needs so much care in other
ways makes frequent demands for sex' (Mace et al 1991: 216). When reading
this no doubt well-meaning reassurance, it is difficult not to imagine a
significant proportion of heterosexual women snorting derisively.
These texts reflect and reproduce wider cultural concerns about female
and male sexuality, and whilst I have no wish to minimise the impact '?~
socially disinhibited behaviour within an enclosed community,19 I think w~
need to begin to reassess the ideologies and assumptions encoded in tb~
teITIlS 'appropriate' and 'inappropriate' as they pertain to the sexually active
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dementia subject. There is also a need to theorise particularities of what
constitutes disinhibited or hyper sexuality and analyse the ways that these
'symptoms' are inscribed onto the female and male body respectively.
McGowin writes with some humour of being 'equipped with a sex drive
accelerating at the speed of a rocket but with nowhere to drive' (1994: 84).
Her account fwther highlights the lack of readily available information on
dementia and sexuality. She is at loss on how to cope with her libidinous
urges until a much trusted female friend suggests she try using a vibrator to
avoid 'inflicting' her needs on a reluctant husband. The solutions available
to McGowin would be inaccessible to the Dementia Specific Hostel resident;
they would be deemed 'inappropriate'. Currently, concepts of what
constitutes 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate' expressions of sexuality are open
to interpretation and cover a range of sexual behaviour from masturbating
publicly to privately caressing a non-spousal partner or object. Not
surprisingly, given the orthodoxy of the medical discursive system,
homosexual or lesbian sexual activity is gestured toward in the most cursory
way as a 'symptom' of disinhibition. In these contexts of sexual
conservatism, the question 'Who did I become?' connotes the dislocation
experienced by the dissident as s/he is processed by the system.
As we move towards the end of the millennia, debates on the ethics and
practicalities of self-authored future directives about our relationships to
medical technology are being voiced. The laws proscribing assisted suicide
and euthanasia are being re-:.evaluated and, in the Northern Territory,
rewritten. People with profound dementia can no longer speak for
themselves on these issues. And as the system currently stands, those still
near the beginning of that continuum are silenced as they become the product
of a regime that 'thrusts into oblivion all those stammered, imperfect words
without fIXed syntax in which the exchange between [dementia] and reason
[is] made' (Foucault 1971: Xii).20
Within the symbolic order that shapes the way that both cultural and
medical signifying systems register those who have lost/are losing their
mind, the abject body has no position from which to speak. To continue to
authorise the relationship between the dementia and non-dementia
communities solely through the abstracted discursive systems of medicine
and law is to continue to deny differences inscribed on the pre-medicalised
body; to continue to deny the value systems that have preceded the subject's
assimilation into the medico-legal system.
McGowin claims the right to speak from within the labyrinth, to deflect
the objectification generated by her role as dementia patient. John Wiltshire
suggests the crucial lessons to be learned from patient narratives. He argues
that biomedical progress has been 'attained at the price of the suppression of
the narratives of its subjects' (1995: 40).21 Within dominant medical
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narratives, difference is erased and the speaking subject silenced. We need to
construct analytical models and ways of talking about the dementia subject
that will address the elisions and silences that presently mark the narratives
producing her/his body. This re-articulation of social difference and
heterogeneity must come from beyond the parameters of a medical
discursive system - if for no other reason than to avoid finding ourselves
asking in future times 'Who did I become?'.
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